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Abstract
Universalism has become a lead idea of global social politics, and of global social security in particular, first voiced in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and renewed in recent calls for “Social Security for All” and “Universal
Health Coverage,” and in the Global Partnership for Universal Social Protection to Achieve the Sustainable Development
Goals launched by the World Bank and the International Labour Organization in 2016. This article analyses the idea of
a universal right to social protection, as recently articulated by international organizations. According to J. W. Meyer’s
neo-institutionalist theory of world society (Krücken & Drori, 2009; Meyer, 2007), universalism is a world-cultural norm,
and international organizations are proponents of world culture. This article is based on the assumption that the meaning
of universalism is not fixed, but that international organizations construct the norm in changing ways to secure worldwide
acceptance and applicability, considering that states have very diverse socio-economic conditions and socio-cultural back-
grounds. Accordingly, the article analyses how international organizations construct the cultural idea of universalism as
well as institutional models of universal social protection. The finding is that the recent calls for universalism represent a
new interpretation of universalism that refers to individual entitlements to benefits rather than collective development,
and that this global consensus was reached by constructing the norm in a way to leave room for interpretation and adap-
tation. However, the price of consensus is the attenuation of the norm, by allowing particularistic interpretations and by
weakening the content of the right to social protection. The article also seeks to explain the rise of the new global consen-
sus and identify its limitations.
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1. Introduction: The Global Call for a Universal Right to
Social Protection
Universalism is a guiding idea of modernity (Parsons &
Shils, 2001) or even of world culture (Krücken & Drori,
2009), first laid down in international law in theUniversal
Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations
(UDHR; UN, 1948), which includes social rights, and con-
firmed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR; UN, 1966). The UDHR posits
the basic equality of all human beings “in dignity and
rights” (UN, 1948, article 1). However, well into the
1990s, the “right to social security” for “everyone,” as
laid down in article 22 of the UDHR and in article 9 of
the ICESCR, had not led to policies that seek to estab-
lish entitlements to social protection benefits for every-
body. The International Labour Organization (ILO) had
mainly pushed for spreading social insurance, which in
the global South only applies to a minority of workers in
the formal, mostly urban sector of the economy.
As late as around 1980, and more forcefully in the
2000s and 2010s, global initiatives for extending the cov-
erage of social security beyond privileged groups took
shape. International organizations have been renewing
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the idea of universalism by calling for extending pub-
lic services to all persons in all countries in the world,
such as “Health for All” (World Health Organization
[WHO], 1979), “Education for All” (UNESCO, 1982),
“Social Security for All” (ILO, 2001, 2003), and “Universal
Health Coverage” (UHC2030, 2019; UN, 2012, 2017).
Recommendation 202 by the ILO on Social Protection
Floors (ILO, 2012) and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development (UN, 2015) also include calls for extend-
ing coverage, “leaving no one behind” (UN, 2015). The
Global Partnership for Universal Social Protection to
Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, launched
by theWorld Bank and the ILO in 2016 (Rutkowski&Ortiz,
2016; USP2030, 2019), eventually generalized and con-
solidated the call for universalism.
In the global North, universalism has been part of the
self-description of the welfare state since WWII, particu-
larly among the Nordic countries (Kildal & Kuhnle, 2005).
In global arenas, all major international organizations
subscribe to the idea of universalism, but some nation-
alist, authoritarian, and theocratic regimes have been
questioning the idea, as do some intellectuals in demo-
cratic societies who view universalism as a late colonial
or patriarchal Western ideology. Social security is both
a lead idea (Kaufmann, 2012, Chapter 5) and the largest
field of social policy. Since around the 2000s, the kindred
term “social protection” has also become common. I use
the two as interchangeable.
This article seeks to make sense of the recent global
calls for universalism by international organizations:
what concept of universalism underlies the calls, how do
international organizations construct the idea of univer-
salism to secure a worldwide consensus on and applica-
bility of the idea of universalism in a socio-economically
and socio-culturally heterogeneous world?
This article is an empirical and conceptual explo-
ration, based on a first screening of documents, and on
results of the FLOOR project (www.floorcash.org; see
also Leisering, 2019a) on the changing views of interna-
tional organizations on social protection since the 1990s
(von Gliszczynski, 2015), the changing interpretation of
social human rights since 1948 (legal branchof the FLOOR
project; Davy, 2013, 2014), and the spread of social cash
transfers in the global South. To my knowledge, there
is only one empirical study of the calls by international
organizations for universalism in social protection, by
Shriwise, Kentikelenis, and Stuckler (in press), who cover
five fields of social protection and argue that universal-
ism is more than just talk; it is a “policy trend” which in-
cludes the introduction of new policy instruments.
The article focuses exclusively on ideas, not on actual
policies, politics, or policy outcomes. However, from a
constructivist sociology of knowledge perspective, I ana-
lyse ideas as part of policy paradigms andparadigm shifts.
Moreover, the focus is on international organizations,
not on national governments and their policies.
The next section is on data and methods, while
Section 3 presents the theoretical framework and spec-
ifies the research questions. Section 4 traces earlier in-
terpretations of universalism and identifies the origins
of the new interpretations that show in the recent calls
by international organizations. Section 5 maps the vari-
ety of institutional models of universal social protection
constructed by international organizations. Section 6
presents the constructions of the cultural idea of uni-
versalism in social protection, by which international or-
ganizations seek to establish universalism as a globally
consensual principle. Section 7 describes the pitfalls to
which the politics of universalism in social protection are
liable. A conclusion follows.
2. Data and Methods
The article is based on an exploratory qualitative content
analysis of the calls for universal social protection and
on results from the FLOOR project, which draws on the
Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse (SKAD;
von Gliszczynski, 2015), applied to documents of inter-
national organizations, and on a legal analysis of human
rights documents (Davy, 2014, 2015). FLOOR has unique
self-constructed exhaustive data sets.
The content analysis traces, among others, refer-
ences to “universal,” “universalistic,” “universalism,” or
“universality,” to “all” (relating to persons or countries),
“everyone,” and “no-one” (as in “leaving no-one be-
hind”). Actors may refer explicitly to “universalism” or
“universality,” or to terms from the semantic field of
universalism, especially “inclusive(ness)” (see, e.g., UN,
2018, 2002, para. 13; World Bank, 2012). From the an-
gle of interpretive sociology, the article assumes that
the meaning of the concept of universalism (and of
other concepts) is not fixed, but that the concept is
“constructed”—interpreted, defined, composed, framed,
or even created—by actors, and that constructions
change over time.
A variety of documents are relevant to the study of
universalism:
• Global calls and campaigns for universal social
protection;
• Human rights declarations and covenants under
the UN, which can also be seen as calls for
universalism;
• Major documents like Recommendation 202 on
Social Protection Floors (ILO, 2012) or the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development of the UN
(2015), which have a broader scope, but rank uni-
versalism among their key principles;
• Other general documents, such as the World
Bank’s Social Protection and Labor Strategy
2012–2022 (World Bank, 2012), which also have
references to universalism (through “inclusion”).
In addition to these more declamatory documents, re-
lated operative documents produced by the secretariats
and committees of the organizations also matter.
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International organizations are only one variety of
what Orenstein (2008, p. 42) calls “transnational actors,”
that is, actors that need not be international in a con-
stitutional sense but operate in multiple nation-states.
Transnational actors in this sense include national de-
velopment organizations like the German GIZ (Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit), global
epistemic communities, social movements, and pol-
icy entrepreneurs like the German consultant Bernd
Schubert. The analysis extends to these “transnational
actors,” even if for convenience, I speak of “interna-
tional organizations.’’
3. Theoretical Framework: Welfare Internationalism
and World Culture
The theoretical framework of this article includes con-
cepts from sociology, global social policy research,
International Relations, and, above all, from neo-
institutionalist world society theory and international law.
The 1940s were a decade of “welfare international-
ism” (Kaufmann, 2012, Chapter 4), that is, international
organizations increasingly took to social issues, as re-
flected, among others, in the Atlantic Charter of 1941,
the ILO Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944, the UN
Charter of 1945, and the UDHR of 1948. All these doc-
uments have an explicitly universal scope. Bob Deacon,
the founding father of global social policy as a research
field, saw the 1990s as a further formative decade of
global social policy, positing a “socialization” of global
politics, i.e., “social” issueswere gainingweight on global
agendas which had been dominated by military and se-
curity matters and by economic issues (Deacon, Hulse, &
Stubbs, 1997, p. 3). Since that time, international orga-
nizations have increasingly become social policy actors,
and international organizations that had been concerned
with social issues before have extended their domains.
The bourgeoning literature on global policy diffusion
has provided ample evidence that ideas and models of
international organizations may feed into domestic poli-
cies (e.g., Böger & Leisering, 2020; Leisering, Liu, & ten
Brink, 2017;Orenstein, 2008; Strang&Chang, 1993; Usui,
1994). Therefore, it makes sense to investigate ideas ad-
vanced by international organizations. In the global so-
cial policy literature, reference is often made to great
ideologies like neo-liberalism, juxtaposed with social-
democratic or progressive thinking (e.g., Deacon, 2007).
There is less literature on more specific ideas, especially
those that cut across policy areas. For example, social-
scientific analyses of social human rights tend to focus
on (insufficient) implementation, rather than analysing
the (changing) meaning and interpretation of the rights
(e.g., Deacon, 2007, pp. 136–137). This article focuses on
a specific global idea, universalism,which cuts across pol-
icy areas and common ideologies, and on the interpreta-
tion of this idea by global actors.
According to Orenstein (2008), an International
Relations scholar, international organizations are “knowl-
edge actors,” and “proposal actors” in particular
(Orenstein, 2008, p. 57), that is, they design and seek
to spread specific models of social policy. International
organizations fall into representative assemblies of the
member states, which govern the organization, and
secretariats that do the operative work, such as the
International Labour Office within the ILO (Barnett &
Finnemore, 2004). The secretariats often have consid-
erable weight and act in relative autonomy. While the
representative assemblies voice more general ideas by
way of declarations, the secretariats engage more in
designing models, and the two sides may not easily
align with each other. In the case of the UN as a so-
cial human rights actor, the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) assumes an operative role, e.g., by issuing
General Comments on selected human rights clauses.
International organizations also differ by their mandates.
The organizations may attend to designated groups
like older persons (HelpAge International) or children
(UNICEF), they may cover designated fields like labour
(ILO) or food (Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO) or
address specific aspects like development (World Bank).
We can expect that the mandate of an international or-
ganization influences the way the organization conceives
of universalism.
Sociological world society theory posits a rising
global consciousness and a shared world culture, unlike
(or rather complementing) socio-economic theories of
globalization (Meyer, 2007, pp. 262–263). “World cul-
ture” denotes globally shared ideas, institutional models,
and “scripts,” which pervade organizations, states, and
the individual life course. Meyer holds that world culture
took off in the 1940s, in response to the “colossal dis-
aster of World War II” (Krücken & Drori, 2009, p. 199).
Social issues were part of world culture right from the
beginning, as welfare internationalism. Themost general
elements of world culture include universalism, individu-
alism, rationalism, and social progress (Krücken & Drori,
2009). World-cultural models include, e.g., school curric-
ula, constitutions, and human rights. Human rights are
the only global codification of citizenship in all its dimen-
sions, civil, political, and social (Kaufmann, 2012, p. 120).
World society theory conceives of international or-
ganizations as key proponents of world culture, as “ob-
jective disinterested others” or “rationalized others,”
who—in the absence of a global democracy—gain le-
gitimacy by advocating universal, world cultural values
rather than articulating sectional interests (Krücken &
Drori, 2009, pp. 186, 188). States subscribe to world-
cultural ideas in order to pose as good states, even if
they cannot or do not want to implement the norms
(strategic “decoupling” or “loose coupling”; Krücken &
Drori, 2009, pp. 181–183). The modern nation-state is
a world-cultural model, and, at the same time, a key
agent ofworld culture (Krücken&Drori, 2009, Chapter 8).
Furthermore, Meyer assumes expansionist dynamics of
world culture, including a growing awareness and articu-
lation of social problems (Krücken & Drori, 2009, p. 199).
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Universalism under the UN human rights framework
means that the rights hold for all persons, all places, and
at all times (Davy, 2015, p. 199). From the perspective of
Meyer’s theory, “place” above all means “nation-state.”
Legally, the states are the addressees of UN human rights
declarations. This helps to disentangle two facets of the
norm of “universalism” in social protection that are in-
tertwined: all states should recognize the right to social
protection (universal validity of the right as a cultural
idea); and in each country, social protection programmes
should cover all persons or citizens (“universal social pro-
tection” as an institutional model of social policy). The
term “model” does not denote a concrete institution
or programme, but a simplified cognitive and normative
blueprint, that is, it is an idea, too. I assume that interna-
tional organizations engage with both types of ideas, as
suggested by Orenstein and Meyer.
I argue that Meyer tends to take the elements of
world culture as given and unchangeable, at least in his
research practice. He and associates primarily investigate
the implementation of elements of world culture, e.g.,
the spread of human rights across states, rather than the
creation and the changing construction of the elements.
In contrast, I argue that world culture is socially con-
structed by and negotiated among actors and is there-
fore variable. As a consequence, global (and national) ac-
tors may develop very different understandings of these
norms and ideas. From this point of view, the spread
of world culture is not only about implementation (cou-
pling/decoupling), but about interpretation among inter-
national organizations (and by national actors).
Consensus on the idea of universalism cannot be
taken for granted, considering that there are around 200
countries in the world that differ considerably in socio-
economic and socio-cultural terms. Davy (2015) chal-
lenges the widespread assumption that universalism as
a global principle was established in 1948 in the UDHR.
She even speaks of universalism as a “myth” (Davy, 2015,
p. 200). Universalism as proclaimed in the UDHR, she ar-
gues, has little substance, it is expressed in abstractword-
ings that remain open for diverse understandings, includ-
ing particularistic interpretations. “It could be that a right
is universal precisely when it can be interpreted in partic-
ularistic terms in many respects” (Davy, 2015, p. 229; au-
thor’s translation). Based on an in-depth study of UNdoc-
uments from 1946 to 1948, Davy finds that in the prepa-
ration of the UDHR, the idea of universalism was subject
to protracted controversies among member states. She
argues that human rights universalism of any substantial
kind is a process. In the decades after the UDHR, nego-
tiations in UN human rights committees gradually filled
the broad label of universalism with substance, to even-
tually achieve a degree of convergence among member
states. It would be more appropriate to speak of univer-
salisation than universalism.
The difficulties of achieving consensus also affect
the recent calls for universalism in social protection.
Accordingly, the article pursues three research questions
regarding the calls: First, how do international organi-
zations construct the general cultural idea of universal-
ism in social protection to enable worldwide acceptance,
considering that the countries in the world have very di-
verse socio-cultural backgrounds? In other words: How
do global actors navigate between the claims of univer-
salism and particularism (see Section 6)? Second, howdo
international organizations translate the general idea of
universalism into specific institutional models (of univer-
sal social protection) in view of enablingworldwide appli-
cability, considering the diversity of socio-economic con-
ditions and of national welfare traditions (see Section 5)?
States have different cultures of welfare, rooted in dis-
tinct traditions of family, of statehood, and of percep-
tions of social problems, which are shaped by religious
and moral traditions. Third, what factors made for the
recent rise of the calls for universalism in social protec-
tion, and why did these calls come so late, decades after
the UDHR? What is new about the interpretation of uni-
versalism voiced in the recent calls (see Section 4)?
4. From Developmental Universalism to Entitlement
Universalism: The Origins of the Recent Calls for
Universalism
Explaining the recent rise of calls for universalism in
social protection is a research desideratum. Earlier re-
search by FLOOR on changing global ideas at least offers
a partial explanation, by identifying an ideational win-
dow of opportunity for the new interpretation of univer-
salism. In the 1990s, a window began to open, through
three fundamental changes in global discourses, all of
which amounted to an individualisation of guiding con-
cepts of global policy, namely development, social hu-
man rights, and poverty. These discursive changes were
conducive to the new interpretation of universalism.
First, development (Leisering, 2019a, pp. 257–260;
von Gliszczynski, 2015, Chapter 4.2). Well into the 1990s,
a collective concept of development had prevailed, with
an emphasis on structural policies relating to global
terms of trade, macroeconomic policies, and the con-
struction of infrastructure (Koehler, 2015). This con-
cept had a universalistic thrust, but in collective rather
than individualistic terms (developmental universalism):
Advancing welfare through economic growth was to ben-
efit growing sections of the population in themiddle and
long term, while individual entitlements to welfare ben-
efits, geared to specified individual needs here and now,
were secondary or even residual. Developmental univer-
salism reflects the idea of “growth-mediated security,”
which is driven by markets, while universalism of individ-
ual entitlements reflects the idea of “support-led secu-
rity” (Drèze & Sen, 1991, p. 22).
From the 1990s, the idea of development changed,
not only to pro-poor growth but to growth by the poor:
The poor were newly conceptualised as potential agents
of economic growth, contributing to development—if
supported by welfare benefits. In this way, social pro-
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tection in the sense of individual entitlements to bene-
fits became part and parcel of development policy, be-
yond the narrow confines of contributory social insur-
ance. Entitlement universalism came to complement de-
velopmental universalism.
Second, poverty. Up to the 1990s, a collective con-
cept of poverty had prevailed. Fighting poverty meant
to raise national GDP and the overall standard of living.
Poverty referred to countries rather than to individuals
living in poverty (Berten & Leisering, 2017, pp. 154–156).
But in 1990, an individualized measure of global poverty
was introduced, the 1$-a-day line (World Bank, 1990,
pp. 27, 139). This was the “first serious attempt to count
the world’s poor using a common measure” (Hulme,
2015, p. 34). The new measure was associated with an
individualization of poverty policies (Leisering, 2019b),
which included direct welfare benefits to the poor.
Third, human rights (Davy, 2013, 2014). Well into the
1990s, article 9 of the ICESCR on the right to social secu-
rity and article 11 on the right to an adequate standard of
living had been mainly interpreted in collective terms, ei-
ther developmental or socialist (UN, 1966). According to
a socialist understanding, social security and livelihoods
were embedded in the socialist organization of produc-
tion. In the collective understandings of rights, individ-
ual entitlements to benefits were secondary or even re-
dundant. As late as the 1990s, an interpretation of so-
cial rights as individual entitlements to benefits came to
prevail, as familiar under post-WWII Northern welfare
states. Nowadays, we take an individualized understand-
ing of social rights for granted, but in historical perspec-
tive it is rather recent. Moreover, the human rights laid
down in the UDHR had generally remained dormant for
decades, to becomemore influential in global discourses
only from the 1990s.
The individualisation of the three guiding concepts—
development, social human rights, poverty—challenged
the dominance of the concept of developmental (or so-
cialist) universalism, suggesting the concept of entitle-
ment universalism which underlies the recent calls for
universalism in social protection. The world cultural prin-
ciple of universalism was wedded to another world cul-
tural principle, individualism. The individualized notion
of universalism marked a thorough-going paradigm shift
(or third order policy change, as defined by Hall, 1993)
in development policy and in poverty policy (Leisering,
2019a, p. 265): a new problem definition (individual
poverty), new discursive frames (individualized concepts
of development, with the poor as agents, and of hu-
man rights), and a new instrument (social cash transfers
to the poor). The new paradigm has established a new
global consensus (for this term see also ILO, 2001) in
the fields of social protection and development policy.
The key call for universalism (Rutkowski & Ortiz, 2016;
USP2030, n.d., 2019) explicitly refers to the new discur-
sive frames by highlighting the collective use of univer-
sal social protection—fostering economic growth, pro-
ductivity, and political stability as well as human rights
(USP2030, n.d.). Similarly, the ILO (2003) aims to “raise
awareness worldwide about the role of social security in
economic and social development.” “Universality” is part
of a “commonunderstanding amongUN agencies” about
a “human rights based approach to development cooper-
ation” (United Nations Sustainable Development Group,
2003; for health see WHO, 2017).
By contrast, Shriwise et al. (in press) maintain that
the calls for universalism do not indicate a paradigm
change in global policy but draw on dominant norms.
However, their window of observation starts as late as
2005, when the paradigm change had already taken
place. The supporting statement by von Gliszczynski
(2015) they quote refers to the time from2008when con-
sensus on social cash transfers was already established.
5. Constructing Institutional Models of Social
Protection: From Universalism to Universalisms
The global calls for universalism in social protection is-
sued by international organizations testify to the assump-
tions of world society theory (Krücken & Drori, 2009;
Meyer, 2007) and International Relations (Orenstein,
2008). By issuing these calls, international organizations
explicitly legitimize themselves by reference to a funda-
mental world cultural idea. More specifically, by devising
models of universal social protection, international orga-
nizations also act as proposal actors, in view of spread-
ing the models worldwide, with states as immediate ad-
dressees. Furthermore, the rise of the calls testifies to
the expansionist dynamics of world culture, by extending
the idea of universalism to the field of social protection,
interpreted as entitlement universalism. This section in-
quires how institutional models of universal social pro-
tectionwere constructed in away to be applicable to very
diverse socio-economic and socio-cultural settings (see
Table 1 for models and proponents). Proponents often
include more than one model in their documents.
The core of universalism regarding models of social
protection, as articulated in the calls by international or-
ganizations, is coverage (see, e.g., USP2030, 2019): full
coverage of all persons by social protection programmes.
Even this seemingly clear-cut operationalization of uni-
versalism is open to interpretation:Who is “all”? And uni-
versalism of what? (Coverage by what?)
Who is “all”? The unit of reference is often vague:
“everyone, as a member of society,” or “all people”
(USP2030, n.d.). Early calls retain the older reference of
social protection to workers rather than citizens, speak-
ing about “working people, particularly in the infor-
mal economy” (ILO, 2003) or “the formal and informal
working population” (UN, 2002, No. 52(c)). The Madrid
International Plan of Action on Ageing refers to an “in-
clusive society for all ages” (UN, 2002, para. 13). The ILO
(2003) also speaks of the countries’ “citizens,” matching
the remit of UN human rights, the states. It is often left
open if migrants are to be included, but USP2030 (n.d.)
names migrants explicitly.
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Who needs to be included to cover “all” persons?
For the ILO (2003) it is mostly informal workers, since
they are not covered by social insurance. Later calls name
a range of other groups, seen as left behind, such as
women, children, persons with disabilities, indigenous
peoples, minorities (USP2030, n.d.) or, relating to health,
“the most vulnerable” (UN, 2017). The 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development stipulates to “reach the fur-
thest behind first” (UN, 2015, No. 4). All these groups
may be positively discriminated in the context of progres-
sive universalism (see Section 6). Regarding countries,
the ILO (2003) only refers to developing countries.
Universalism of what? When speaking about univer-
sal coverage, actors may refer to welfare provisions, to
entitlements to benefits, and to access to social services.
Many documents call for setting up welfare pro-
grammes and providing benefits, but not necessarily for
individual rights or entitlements. The World Bank, for ex-
ample, while not rejecting rights, inmost documents sim-
ply does not mention rights, e.g., when conceiving of
social safety nets for the poor (World Bank, 2018). The
Social Protection Floors (ILO, 2012) call for “guarantees”
rather than rights. I call these approaches provision uni-
versalism, in contradistinction to entitlement universal-
ism, which emphasizes the rights character of provisions
(see similarly Leisering, 2019a, pp. 142–143). USP2030
exemplifies the latter.
The third variety, access universalism, applies to so-
cial services in particular (but also to income security;
see, e.g., ILO, 2003). Related policies seek to set up in-
frastructure to ensure that all citizens, including, e.g.,
persons living in remote areas or persons with disabili-
ties, have access to delivery agencies like hospitals, nurs-
ing homes, and advice centres. Having access to ser-
vices is not identical with having entitlements to services.
Entitlements relate to law and legal regulations, while ac-
cess depends on social space and the organization of ser-
vice delivery. Proclaiming access universalism need not
go along with bestowing entitlements on citizens, rather
it is about how dense the social infrastructure ought to
be. This technocratic approach eases the challenge of
universalism. The emphasis on building social infrastruc-
ture (Gough, 2019) reflects a collectivist interpretation
of social rights. In the field of health services, calls for
universalism tend to lean towards provision universalism
and access universalism (e.g., UHC2030, 2019).
Entitlement universalism further ramifies into what
I call benefit universalism and protection universalism.
Benefit universalism denotes the rare case that every-
body is entitled to receipt of benefits, irrespective of
need. Strictly speaking, the idea of an unconditional
Basic Income (UBI) is the only example. Protection univer-
salism refers to programmes that bestow entitlements
on every citizen to receive benefits when affected by a
designated contingency.
For most social protection programmes, entitlement
universalism means protection universalism (Barrientos
& Hulme, 2008, p. 324; Leisering, 2019a, p. 80). This is
obvious for social insurance, which bestows benefits on
citizens only if certain risks occur, such as old age, un-
employment, work accident, or ill-health. Protection uni-
versalism in the case of means-tested social cash trans-
fers, however, is contested. Here, protection universal-
ismmeans that transfers are only paid in case of poverty,
to be ascertained by a means test. From this point of
view, even means-tested benefits can be (protection)
universal or at least contribute to the overall coverage
of social protection in a country. Protection universalism
seems to be taken for granted by the calls, as hinted at in
“cash transfers for all who need it” (USP2030, n.d.) and in
“universal health coverage means all people have access
to the health care they need, when andwhere they need
it” (WHO, 2019).
Cutting across the basic forms of universalism—
provision universalism, entitlement universalism, access
universalism—programme universalism and systemic
universalism can be distinguished.
Programme universalism refers to universal coverage
by single welfare programmes. Thinking in terms of pro-
gramme universalism is common in global politics, espe-
cially in the calls for “universal” pensions and “universal”
child benefits (which in fact are categorical). Programme
universalism is less abstract and may make consensus
easier. Also, programme universalism is mostly categori-
cal, and thereby particularistic, referring to a designated
social group or rather “category” constructed by the pro-
grammes. The members of each category are assumed
to share certain characteristics relevant to social pro-
tection, distinct from other categories. A categorical ap-
proach constructs social categories or groups as deserv-
ing, underpinned by recourse to theorizations (in the
case of children, e.g., by theories about the special needs
of children) and cultural linkages (in the case of chil-
dren, e.g., to the human value of children and the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989; on the-
orization and cultural linkages as strategies of spread-
ing policies see Strang & Meyer, 1993). Life-cycle groups
are the most common way of constructing target cat-
egories, with two categories standing out: older per-
sons and children. Social cash transfer programmes for
these categories have been actively promoted by inter-
national organizations with a pertinentmandate, namely
by HelpAge International and UNICEF (see the discourse
analysis by von Gliszczynski & Leisering, 2016). In the
field of health, calls for non-categorical programmes are
more common: UHC2030 (2019) calls for health systems
that are accessible to all, “irrespective of socio-economic
or legal status.”
By contrast, the general calls for universalism like
USP2030 tend implicitly or explicitly to refer to sys-
temic universalism, that is, to realizing universal cover-
age by the joint operation of several social protection
programmes in a country. This idea may meet with less
acceptance among states, because achieving systemic
universalism is more demanding than programme uni-
versalism. Systemic universalism requires the design of
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Table 1. Varieties of models of universal social protection.
Proponents
Universalism of what?
Provision universalism Various actors and documents, including the Social Protection Floors (ILO, 2012),
the ICESCR, article 12 on health (UN, 1966), UHC2030 (2019), World Bank (2018)
Entitlement universalism Human rights organizations (e.g., FIAN, HelpAge International)
Benefit universalism Basic Income Earth Network
Protection universalism Most actors, explicitly, e.g., ECOSOC (2008, General Comment No. 19 on the right to
social security); USP2030 (n.d., 2019)
Access universalism UN General Assembly (UN, 2012, 2017, Universal Health Coverage)
Universalism by what?
Programme universalism HelpAge International, Development Pathways (social pensions);
UNICEF (child benefits; Basic Income Earth Network)
Systemic universalism Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (2019);
USP2030 (n.d., 2019)
Categorical universalism ILO (2012, Social Protection Floors, 2010, Staircase Model)
Non-categorical universalism Global policy entrepreneur Schubert (2018)
Mixed universalism World Bank (Gentilini et al., 2020)
a composite architecture of social protection in a coun-
try. To this end, links between separate policy communi-
ties and constituencies need to be forged, programme
administrations need to be coordinated, and an inte-
grated normative framework needs to be designed. Such
composite design has a horizontal dimension—including
programmes for different groups and different social
problems—and a vertical dimension, ranging from lower
to higher tiers of social protection.
In the horizontal dimension, systemic universalism is
mostly categorically differentiated (categorical universal-
ism), with separate programmes for different categories,
as for life-cycle categories in the ILO’s model of the Social
Protection Floors (ILO, 2012). The USP2030 (2019) envis-
ages a combination of “cash or in-kind benefits, contrib-
utory or non-contributory schemes, and programmes to
enhance human capital, productive assets, and access
to jobs.”
In the vertical dimension, the ILO (2010, pp. 19–20),
the traditional champion of social insurance, has con-
ceived of a tiered “staircase” model, which has the so-
cial floor(s) as bottom tier and social insurance as the
mainstay, adding up to universal coverage in the vertical
dimension. Other models have both a horizontal and a
vertical dimension. The global policy entrepreneur Bernd
Schubert (2018, p. 8) conceives of a systemically univer-
sal architecture of basic social protection in Sub-Saharan
countries, differentiated by degree and kinds of poverty
of the addressees (non-categorical universalism). The ar-
chitecture includes emergency relief, insurance against
ill-health, disability, and death of a breadwinner, pub-
lic works, an education grant, and non-categorical social
cash transfers. The three-dimensional “social assistance
cube” designed by the World Bank (Gentilini, Grosh,
Rigolini, & Yemtsov, 2020, p. 21) combines a variety
of categorical and non-categorical programmes, includ-
ing social cash transfers, tied cash benefits (like school
fee waivers), benefits in kind, and a small UBI compo-
nent, adding up to amixed (categorical/non-categorical)
universalism.
Alternatively, universal coverage can also be
achieved by way of programme universalism, namely
by a single programme that covers all citizens (unlike,
e.g., “universal” pensions), like a national health ser-
vice or a “general social assistance” programme that
addresses all citizens purely on the basis of need (as-
certained through a means test), irrespective of mem-
bership in a designated socio-demographic group (non-
categorical programme universalism). A UBI would be
a non-means-tested variety of a non-categorical pro-
gramme that achieves universal coverage. Among inter-
national organizations, general social assistance belongs
to the consensual models of social cash transfers, but
political support is weakest (von Gliszczynski & Leisering,
2016). The model is not actively promoted by any in-
ternational organizations, none has a mandate for it.
Only Schubert (2018) has been spreading a variety of
the model in Sub-Saharan Africa, occasionally supported
by UNICEF or other international organizations. In the
case of single programmes that cover all citizens the dis-
tinction between programme universalism and systemic
universalism is blurred.
The UBI looms large in global debates and is par-
ticularly advocated by the Basic Income Earth Network
(BIEN), but was not designated by any major interna-
tional organization as a model of basic income protec-
tion during the formative years of social cash transfers,
the 2000s (Leisering, 2019a, Chapter 4). A recent World
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Bank publication considers a UBI, but only as a possi-
ble small building block of the “social assistance cube”
(Gentilini et al., 2020, p. 21). Debates on a UBI are decou-
pled from two major discursive frames of global debates
on social protection, namely development and human
rights (Leisering, 2019a, p. 364; von Gliszczynski, 2017).
We may conclude that the call for universalism in so-
cial protection, even if only in a technical sense of ex-
tending coverage, is not as clear-cut as it sounds, and
allows for a range of institutional models of universal-
ism. Universalism is an empty mould—Shriwise et al. (in
press) similarly speak of a “discursive umbrella”—that
can be filled by many programme designs and norma-
tive models.
6. Constructing the Cultural Idea of Universalism in
Social Protection: Consensus by Attenuation
The global spread of institutional models of universal so-
cial protection is predicated on a consensus on the cul-
tural idea of universalism in social protection. How has
the idea or norm of universalism been constructed to
meet with acceptance by very heterogeneous countries?
Considering that the idea of universalism may be
foreign to the elites or the ordinary citizens in some
countries, international organizations seek to loosen the
claims of universalism. In this section, three discursive
strategies by which international organizations ease the
claims of universalism are identified: phrasing the idea of
universalism in abstract or vague terms; offering a broad
choice of institutional models of universalism and allow-
ing for national adaptation; and weakening the content
of the norm that is to be spread worldwide, the right to
social security.
6.1. Phrasing the Idea of Universalism in Abstract Terms
The principle of universalism is mostly worded in very
general terms, in the UN human rights framework and
in the calls by international organizations. This applies to
the vague definition of standards (see Section 6.3 below)
as well as to the diverse units of reference of universal-
ism (described in Section 5 above). All thismakes it easier
for actors with different backgrounds to accept universal-
ism and advance particularistic interpretations.
6.2. Offering Choice and Adaptation of Global Models
I have shown that international organizations, including
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs),
and donors propose a range of models. This is likely to
raise the applicability of global models of social protec-
tion to particular national conditions, leaving choices to
the states. In this way, international organizations han-
dle the tension between propagating global “best prac-
tices” (e.g., Rio Group, 2006) on the one hand, and hold-
ing up the flag of “country ownership” (e.g., World Bank,
2008, p. 382) and discrediting notions of “one size fits all”
(e.g., ILO, 2010, p. 21) on the other hand. All main calls by
international organizations explicitly emphasize that the
states are to choose and adapt the global models, based
on an acknowledgement of diverse national conditions:
There are many paths towards universal social pro-
tection. Both the ILO and the World Bank fully rec-
ognize: national ownership of development processes
towards universalism. (ILO & World Bank, 2015, p. 2;
similarly USP2030, n.d.)
There is no universal approach to expanding social se-
curity coverage. (ILO, 2003; similarly UN, 2002)
National ownership: Develop social protection strate-
gies and policies based on national priorities and
circumstances. (USP2030, 2019; similarly UN, 2002,
article 8)
A frequent choice encouraged by sectional governmen-
tal and non-governmental international organizations is
programme universalism, especially by way of “univer-
sal” social pensions and “universal” child benefit, de-
picted as a step towards systemic universalism. Even
within the main types of models—programme universal-
ism, systemic universalism, benefit universalism, protec-
tion universalism—there is much variation and choice.
For example, categorical systemic universalism can be
constructed in many ways, depending on the selec-
tion and construction of the categories, their differen-
tial treatment, and combinations with non-categorical
elements.
The acceptance and applicability of global models is
also facilitated by the construction of what I call “meta
models.” In the case of basic social protection, the uni-
versalistic idea of social cash transfers for the poor could
only become consensual among international organiza-
tions, because during the formative years of the idea of
social cash transfers (the 2000s) four particularistic sub-
models were constructed that reflect domains of interna-
tional organizations, while the general idea of cash trans-
fers remained an empty meta model (Leisering, 2019a,
Chapter 4). In this way, different policy actors could ad-
vocate for different interpretations of the core ideas. The
multi-pillar model of the World Bank (1994) can also be
seen as a meta model, in the field of old-age security.
6.3. Weakening the Content of the Right to Social
Security
Three avenues of weakening the right to social secu-
rity can be identified among international organizations:
temporalization; vague or absent benefit standards; and
recognizing collective interpretations of social rights.
The first avenue of weakening the right to social secu-
rity, temporalisation of universalism, means allowing for
a gradual extension of social protection coverage rather
than requiring countries to cover all citizens in one go.
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This “progressive universalism” (UHC2030, 2019) is mod-
elled on the principle of “progressive realization” laid
down in the UN human rights framework as acceptable
state behaviour (ICESCR, article 2(1); UN, 1966), taken
up, e.g., in the ILO’s Social Protection Floors (ILO, 2012,
Section I, 3). Temporalisation makes the idea of univer-
salism more acceptable, because it is less demanding
policy-wise and because it allows for diverse strategies
ofmoving closer to universalism, including decidedly par-
ticularistic strategies according to the interests and ideas
that prevail in domestic politics. Above all, selected social
groups can be prioritized and positively discriminated
(see Section 5).
Temporalisation is found in all major calls for uni-
versalism: “encourage countries to extend social secu-
rity to more of their citizens” (ILO, 2003; similarly UN,
2002, para. 52(c)). The Sustainable Development Goals
(Goal 1.3; UN, 2015) specify an interim goal: “By 2030,
[to] achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the
vulnerable.” Temporalisation may also be offered as a
choice: as a “choice of countries to aim for gradual and
progressive realization or immediate universal coverage”
(ILO &World Bank, 2015, p. 2). Temporalisation may also
refer to countries as targeted by international organiza-
tions: “increase the number of countries that provide uni-
versal social protection” (USP2030, n.d.). Instead of ex-
tending coverage, temporalisationmay also refer to grad-
ually reaching higher standards (of health services; UN,
2002, article 14).
The second avenue refers to leaving benefit standards
vague or even doing without standards. Obviously, this
makes universalism easier to swallow for the states. In
documents on universalism and inclusiveness, interna-
tional organizations tend to focus on coverage, but re-
main silent or vague when it comes to the level of ben-
efits or even benefit standards. Remarkably, even mini-
mum standards of social protection play a marginal role
in global discourses. Even the UN human rights frame-
work lacks minimum standards in social security (Davy,
2015). In the ICESCR, the benefit level is vaguely defined—
article 11 posits an “adequate” standard of living—and ar-
ticle 9, the shortest in theCovenant, has no standard at all,
even though the article encapsulates the human rights
core of universal social protection, the right of everyone
to social security (UN, 1966). The specification of article
9 was left to the ILO (Davy, 2013, p. S22) and to the states.
Similarly, ILO Recommendation 202 on Social Protection
Floors delegates benefit standards to the states (ILO,
2012). USP2030 (n.d.) calls for “adequate” cash transfers.
In the health sector, the ICESCR (article 12) proclaims
“the highest attainable standard,” but more specific doc-
uments name malleable standards like “safe, quality ser-
vices and products” (UHC2030, 2019), “essential health
services,” and “primary health care” (WHO, 2019).
The third avenue of weakening the right to social
security is giving weight to developmental universalism
and access universalism (emphasizing social infrastruc-
ture), which reflect collective interpretations of social
rights, as analysed in Sections 4 and 5. Highlighting collec-
tive strategies of universalismwhile attributing a residual
role to welfare entitlements, may be applauded by some
states in the quest for economic progress.
7. Pitfalls
I argue that that the new global consensus on universal-
ism in social protection is liable to pitfalls when turned
into policies. Three pitfalls can be distinguished: mal-
leability; residualism; and, closely linked, inequality.
Themalleability of the idea of universalism, while en-
abling the global acceptance of the idea, allows for partic-
ularistic interpretations and realizations to be presented
under the flag of universalism. The idea of universalism
creates an open space in which activists can lobby for
the interests of particular groups. Concern of minority
groups may eclipse the needs of majority groups. For
example, progressive universalism can lead to prioritiza-
tions based on sectional attributions of deservingness
and powerful lobby groups.
On residualism: Universalistic programmes tend to
have indefinite or low benefits, in practice as well as
in the policy conceptions of international organizations.
The German sociologist Georg Simmel (1908/1965) ar-
gued that benefits that accrue to everybody, without
stipulating any specific quality or achievement of a per-
son, tend to be low. This may apply to universal ben-
efits. Universalistic social policy, therefore, risks to be-
come residual.
This is closely linked to the issue of inequality. Korpi
and Palme (1998) identify a “paradox of redistribution”:
policies that concentrate their efforts on the poor, are
less successful in fighting poverty and inequality. This
finding is often taken as an argument against means-
tested benefits (social assistance, social cash transfers),
but according to Korpi and Palme the paradox of re-
distribution also applies to universal programmes (here
defined as non-means-tested and flat-rate). Universal
programmes leave a “space of inequality” (Leisering
& Marschallek, 2010) above basic social protection—a
space which the middle classes fill by taking up more
generous private and occupational welfare. As a conse-
quence, the middle classes are likely to lose interest in
public welfare and diminish their political support; the
fiscal space of government will narrow, and the univer-
sal programmes will deteriorate:
The solidarity of flat-rate universalism presumes a his-
torically peculiar class structure, one in which the
vast majority of the population are the “little peo-
ple” for whom a modest, albeit egalitarian, benefit
may be considered adequate. Where this no longer
obtains, as occurs with growing working-class pros-
perity and the rise of the new middle classes, flat-
rate universalism inadvertently promotes dualism be-
cause the better-off turn to private insurance and to
fringe-benefit bargaining…the result is that the won-
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derfully egalitarian spirit of universalism turns into a
dualism similar to that of the social-assistance state:
the poor rely on the state, and the remainder on the
market. (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 25)
Generally speaking, universalism is basically an egali-
tarian notion, but universalistic policies are prone to
create social divisions, in several ways. Categorical uni-
versalism, which is more common than non-categorical
universalism, creates fragmentation and inequalities be-
tween social groups. Temporalization of the right to so-
cial protection (progressive universalism) excludes cer-
tain groups. And the residualist tendency of universalism
entails a dualistic structure of stratification, as described
by Esping-Andersen in the above quote. According to
Korpi and Palme (1998), a multi-tiered (“encompassing”)
model of social protection (realizing systemic universal-
ism) is more successful in fighting poverty and inequality
than universalistic programmes. But substantial inequal-
ity would remain. Fighting poverty has been at the cen-
tre of global development politics since the Millennium
Development Goals of 2000, but in the 2010s, the even
bigger challenge of increasing inequality has come to the
fore. The idea and practice of universalism is of little avail
in reducing inequality beyond alleviating poverty.
8. Conclusion: A New Global Consensus and Its
Limitations
Universalism seems to be a clearly defined and consen-
sual principle, but on closer examination it turns out that
this global norm is subject to diverse and changing inter-
pretations, and that achieving consensus is demanding.
The recent calls for universalism in social security by in-
ternational organizations represent a new, individualis-
tic interpretation of this norm (what I call entitlement
universalism), which qualifies collectivist, developmen-
tal interpretations that had prevailed well into the 1990s.
The new universalism is part of a paradigm shift in global
social policy and in development policy. The global con-
sensus on the new universalism could only be achieved
because international organizations have left room for di-
verse interpretations and institutional models: by allow-
ing for less demanding varieties of universalism like pro-
vision universalism, access universalism, and programme
universalism, and through discursive strategies that at-
tenuate the right to social security.
The malleability of universalism as a world-cultural
norm contributes to the unity of world society, by me-
diating the tension between a unified world culture and
the socio-cultural heterogeneity of the world. In political
terms, the malleability of the new norm enables coali-
tions between dissimilar actors, as between the World
Bank, the ILO and others under the USP2030. The polit-
ical utility of open or even vague concepts has been ob-
served by writers for some time (e.g., Luhmann, 1970).
However, the price of consensus is the attenuation of
the norm, by allowing particularistic interpretations and
by weakening the content of the right to social protec-
tion.Moreover, universalism is liable to pitfalls, including
the risk of residual universalism and new social divisions,
leaving the vast social inequalities in the global South
unattended. Furthermore, global migration flows are un-
dermining the territorial state and the status of national
citizenship as units of reference for the universalization
of social human rights. The increasing fluidity of global
labour in an age of digitalization and cyberspace, with
new forms like platformwork,may also require newways
of providing security “to all people wherever and how-
ever they work” (Packard et al., 2019, a World Bank pub-
lication). New elements of world culture will be needed
to frame such changes.
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